Spade’s Love

Dean Spade’s latest book, Love in a F*ucked Up World: How to Build Relationships, Hook Up, and Raise Hell Together (2025), is a self-help volume with a distinctive mission. The book’s self-improvement stylings arrive amidst the highly intentional teachings of an established social movement activist, organizer, and institution-builder writing here primarily for a younger generation on or open to the political left. The book leverages hardscrabble wisdom wrought from Spade’s years on the political front lines as deepened by serious psychological study and reflection. The result is a book offering readers a space for meaningful self-witness. Love encourages readers to discover via self-reflection that many of the forces they oppose “out there” in the social world also operate within themselves. The book’s self-help resources then guide readers toward the transformative self-healing that may follow—producing selves capable of new intimacies, relationships, and social movement work that may yet set them, and the rest of us, free.

Love’s self-help advice unfolds across digestibly structured chapters. These carve-ups give readers opportunities to process the book’s instruction and self-exam prompts, making the experience almost dialogic. The book braids self-help advice with political argument and complements both with first-person narrative and fictionalized vignettes that supply readers with additional layered contact points for approaching its ideas, questions, questionnaires, assessment tools, and worksheets. Continue reading "Spade’s Love"

An Antitrust Prescription for Ailing Rural Hospitals

Theodosia Stavroulaki, The Healing Power of Antitrust, 119 Nw. U. L. Rev. 943 (2025).

The phrase “hospital desert” sanitizes a brutal reality for millions of rural Americans: the closure of a local hospital means longer journeys for life-saving care, worse health outcomes, and the hollowing out of fragile local economies. While many commentators point to demographic changes and strained budgets as primary causes of this growing crisis, in her compelling new article, The Healing Power of Antitrust, Theodosia Stavroulaki argues that we have been misdiagnosing the problem. She shows that hospital deserts are also the product of anticompetitive practices and enforcement failures—noncompete clauses that drive clinicians away, hospital mergers that strip rural communities of services, and regulatory blind spots that treat closures as unavoidable. Stavroulaki calls for antitrust enforcers to embrace their “healing power” by addressing these practices head-on, proposing reforms that expand merger analysis to labor markets, ban healthcare noncompete agreements, and condition rural hospital mergers on commitments to preserve services. Stavroulaki thus shows that antitrust is not simply a tool for protecting consumer welfare, but can also advance health equity by addressing the geographic disparities that leave rural patients behind.

Stavroulaki begins by powerfully situating what is at stake with the rural hospital closure crisis. Rural hospitals serve communities that are poorer, older, sicker, and more likely to be uninsured. These communities also experience higher rates of chronic conditions, disability, and substance use. Unsurprisingly, rural communities rely heavily on their hospitals to meet their healthcare needs. Moreover, because hospitals are often the largest local employer—generating jobs, purchasing goods and services, and sustaining community life—many rural hospitals serve as their community’s economic anchor. When a rural hospital closes, the resulting hospital desert can devastate the community, endangering lives and destabilizing the local economy. Continue reading "An Antitrust Prescription for Ailing Rural Hospitals"

What We Can Learn from Family Abolition

Susan Frelich Appleton & Albertina Antognini, Abolishing the Family, 61 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. __ (forthcoming, 2026), available at SSRN (Aug. 1, 2025).

There are benefits to thinking about extreme proposals—suggested utopias and radical restructurings of institutions. However unlikely it might be that such proposals are ever put into effect, they help us to think more clearly both about what needs to be changed and about what might yet be feasible. The particular extreme or utopian (or perhaps dystopian) set of proposals Susan Frelich Appleton and Albertina Antognini consider in their recent work is, as their title indicates, “abolishing the family.” While family, in conventional social and political ideologies, is often presented as an ideal, it has also for a long time been the subject of sharp criticism by many feminists and more than a few family law scholars. And, from the perspective of such critics, moderate reforms have turned out to be frustrating, teaching us (as the authors put it) “not only that inequality and its counterpart, privilege, continuously find ways to reassert themselves” (P. 60, fn omitted), but also that many suggested reforms “have failed because they defy core pillars of what families are assumed to be or do.” (P. 61.)

As the authors note (P. 4), the analysis of family abolition broadly evokes the discussion of abolishing marriage associated with Martha Fineman in work such as The Neutered Mother, the Sexual Family and Other Twentieth Century Tragedies and others (see, e.g., the contributors to Anita Bernstein (ed.), Marriage Proposals: Questioning a Legal Status and Elizabeth Brake (ed.), After Marriage: Rethinking Marital Relationships). During the later stages of the same-sex marriage movement, some more conservative voices also urged getting the state out of the business of recognizing marriage (so as not to be forced to give official sanction to same-sex unions). Despite such right-wing arguments joining critiques from within the LGBTQ+ movement and older left-wing arguments against marriage, civil marriage, now expanded to include same-sex couples, is still with us, and with little likelihood of imminent abolition. Continue reading "What We Can Learn from Family Abolition"

The Supreme Court’s Failure to Stop the Politics of Mass Incarceration

The United States imprisons about 1.8 million people—more than any other nation. Roughly a quarter of those behind bars have not been convicted; they are detained while awaiting a court hearing. The burden is not evenly distributed: the share of black men in prison is three times their share of the national population. What explains America’s commitment to spending so much to lock up so many? In her previous book, Prisoners of Politics (2019), Rachel Barkow put the blame squarely on the fact that U.S. criminal justice policy at every level—local, state, and federal—is made by politicians and voters rather than agencies informed insulated from political pressure and informed by expert analysis. The public perennially demands tough-on-crime policies. Legislators oblige by enacting ever-harsher laws. Elected prosecutors enforce those laws. Reforms won in recent years through politics—election of progressive prosecutors, bail reform, decriminalization of marijuana, and modest sentencing law changes—barely moved the needle.

Barkow’s new book, Justice Abandoned, starts with the same convincing premise: populist and politicized policymaking generally sustains the laws and practices that produce mass incarceration. She has now shifted both the focus for blame and reform to the U.S. Supreme Court, a choice both obvious and odd. Obvious because the Court clearly deserves some of the blame: for decades it has ruled, in a variety of cases that Barkow astutely unpacks, that the Constitution puts few restraints on the policies that have filled American prisons and jails. Odd because if there is one institution less likely than Congress or prosecutors to put the brakes on mass incarceration, it would seem to be the current Court. Continue reading "The Supreme Court’s Failure to Stop the Politics of Mass Incarceration"

Take Notice: Governmental Review of Class Action Settlements

Class action practitioners and scholars are well aware that before a federal court may approve a class action settlement, the judge must assess the settlement’s fairness, adequacy, and reasonableness under various Rule 23(e) requirements. The Advisory Committee on Civil Rules has paid heightened attention to settlement approval, amending Rule 23(e) in 2003 and 2018. State class action procedures contain similar rules relating to judicial scrutiny of state class settlements.

Although the judicial role in overseeing class action settlements is well known, the role of governmental entities under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA) in assessing class settlements has been somewhat overlooked in class action scholarship. This is not surprising; since CAFA federalized class action procedure, academic discussions of CAFA’s intricacies has receded. Michael Solimine and Hailey Martin’s recent article in the Journal of Legislation reminds us that CAFA intended to provide governmental entities with an additional role in assessing class action settlements, including rights to comment and object. Their article assesses the effect of CAFA’s provision for governmental oversight of class settlements. Continue reading "Take Notice: Governmental Review of Class Action Settlements"

Putting the Original Back into Tax Originalism

Conor Clarke & Ari Glogower, Apportioned Direct Taxes, 79 Tax L. Rev. __ (forthcoming 2026), available at SSRN.

In June 2024 the Supreme Court issued its decision in Moore v. United States, a case many had predicted would be one of the most consequential tax cases of the past century. Instead, however, the Court managed to avoid deciding the most difficult and consequential issues by reframing the case and ruling on narrower, more technical grounds. Yet Moore may well still prove as consequential as expected, but for a different reason– that, for the first time, the Court explicitly utilized the “history and tradition” to interpret the taxing power, stating that “the Sixteenth Amendment expressly confirmed what had been the understanding of the Constitution before Pollock …” In doing so, Moore also serves as an invitation to to reconsider the historical record and understanding of the taxing power specifically with an eye towards shaping the Court’s modern interpretation of the Constitution.

Conor Clarke and Ari Glogower take up this cause in their new article, Apportioned Direct Taxes (ADT). The authors have two primary goals in ADT: (1) to provide a comprehensive survey of all “direct tax” legislation adopted by Congress prior to the Sixteenth Amendment including not only legislative history but administration and enforcement considerations as well, and (2) to identify what if any lessons emerge from that survey to help the courts to interpret the breadth and scope of the term “direct taxes” as used in the Constitution. Continue reading "Putting the Original Back into Tax Originalism"

Institutional Disinterest

Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, The Cleansing Effect of Shareholder Approval in a World of Common Ownership, available at SSRN (Nov. 18, 2024).

It’s been ten years since MFW and Corwin opened a process pathway to business judgment review of cashout mergers, subject to Weinberger, and arm’s length mergers, subject to Revlon. At the time the cases came down, I anticipated smooth sailing for the cases’ two-track cleansing regime, under which the defendant needs independent director approval followed by ratification by a fully informed and uncoerced majority of disinterested shareholders. I figured that we had enough law in place on each of the tracks to make their application a straightforward matter. The components of the board approval leg, director independence and a special committee process, were focal point matters in late twentieth-century corporate governance, and there were plenty of Delaware cases providing guidance. The shareholder approval leg had a sketchier background. We had a well-developed law, mostly federal, on the full information requirement, and we knew coercion when we saw it. We had much less on the table to help us with precise questions respecting majority disinterested shareholder approval, because shareholder ratification had not theretofore been the usual practice recourse respecting conflicted transactions. But how hard could it be to fill in the details?

It turned out to be a lot harder than I thought. MFW and Corwin came down before everybody’s attention turned to the Big Three institutional investors and their growing block of voting shares and the closely related question of portfolio investor incentives, in particular the incentives of “common owners.” Common owner conflicts first popped up on the screen in 2004 with the empty voting allegations triggered by the Mylan-King merger agreement. The problem has been looming larger ever since, implicating not just corporate governance but antitrust. Continue reading "Institutional Disinterest"

Slowing Down the Clicks

Brett Frischmann & Moshe Y. Vardi, Better Digital Contracts with Prosocial Friction-in-Design, 65 Jurimetrics J. 1 (2025).

Brett Frischmann and Moshe Y. Vardi’s article, Better Digital Contracts with Prosocial Friction-in-Design, wrestles with perhaps the most vexing problem facing contract law today – what to do about the proliferation of digital contracts that infest our screens. Frischmann and Vardi tackle the problem from a different angle than most contracts scholars (perhaps not surprising given their background and expertise in technology). Rather than focusing exclusively on doctrinal or legislative solutions, they propose design-based solutions that reframe and reconceptualize assent (and consent).

Their article begins with a critique of digital contracting (while they use the term “digital contracting”, they are mostly concerned with wrap contracts, such as clickwraps and browsewraps, and not DocuSign-type documents). The failure of digital contracting as an aspirational ideal has to do with digital contracting systems, which they define as “the combination of law and code-based architecture that generates boilerplate.” (P. 4.) These systems fail not simply as implementation of the traditional model of contracts (two parties bargaining and reaching mutual assent or a “meeting of the minds”), but more tragically for humanity, they “generate contracting behavior and contractual relationships that are as far from the ideal as one can imagine.” (P. 4.) Continue reading "Slowing Down the Clicks"

Adding Color to the Founding

James G. Basker & Nicole Seary, eds., Black Writers of the Founding Era: A Library of America Anthology (2023).

The Founding was for Whites. Or so it would seem, according to most contemporary histories or legal accounts of the era. Black Writers of the Founding Era, edited by Jim Basker and Nicole Seary, adds important color to that history. This edited volume is the most comprehensive compilation of Black-authored editorials, letters, court petitions, sermons, and poems to date, and the first such compilation of Black writings during the Founding in over 50 years.

Very few Black men and women at the Founding were literate. Whereas 90% of the white population was literate in 1790, roughly 90% of the Black population at the Founding were enslaved, and a very small percentage of the entire Black population (5-10%) was literate. In two states—South Carolina and Georgia—teaching an enslaved person to read and write was illegal. The few extant Black writings have been difficult to find, or out of print. The paucity of Black writings from the Framing has inevitably led to their absence in historical and legal accounts. As a result, it has been assumed that the Founding was not for them: the Constitution was not theirs, and the Revolution was fought only for those they served ala. In part, this has led many to conclude, ala Justice Thurgood Marshall’s famous Bicentennial speech, that “We the People” excluded Black Americans and turn to alternative narratives of American history like the 1619 Project. Continue reading "Adding Color to the Founding"

How to Avoid Trumping the Legal History of Removal

Andrea Scoseria Katz, Noah A. Rosenblum, & Jane Manners, Disagreement and Historical Argument or How Not to Think About Removal, 58 U. Mich. J. L. Reform 555 (2025).

Donald Trump has placed the issue of the President’s removal power before the Supreme Court, and its answer will undoubtedly be one of its most important decisions in the entire field of administrative law. Independent agencies, where leadership is appointed by the President with Senate approval and can only be removed for cause, have been a mainstay of our modern administrative state since its development in the late nineteenth century. The first modern agency, the Interstate Commerce Commission, was structured in this manner, and the model has been regularly employed for many others, including the Federal Trade Commission, the Securities Exchange Commission, and the Federal Reserve Board.

Although prediction is a notoriously difficult enterprise, current indications are that the Court will accede to Trump’s argument (sometimes described as the unitary executive theory) that the President has inherent power to remove most, or all, executive officials and that the many enacted provisions limiting him to removal for cause are unconstitutional. This will reverse a century of Supreme Court doctrine; indeed, except for some expansive language in Chief Justice Taft’s 1926 decision in Myers v. U.S. (whose actual holding is the uncontroversial principle that Congress may not participate in the removal process), the Court has never questioned the constitutional validity of independent agencies. In decisions such as Seila Law v. CFPB and Free Enterprise Fund v. PCOAB, it struck down the use of for cause provisions to create innovative agency structures, but it left the basic principle – as articulated in Humphrey’s Executor v. U.S. and revised in Morrison v. Olson — intact. The pragmatic consequences that will flow from reversing this long-established doctrine will be unfortunate at best. Donald Trump has demonstrated hostility to democratic governance and the rule of law, not merely by statements and behaviors reported by the press, but through actions repeatedly struck down by federal courts. In other words, his troubling pattern of political and legal irresponsibility can be discerned from the legal record that falls within the Court’s institutional purview. To grant him the power to ignore the limits that have accompanied Congressional grants of authority for one hundred fifty years and exercise sole control of the entire administrative apparatus is to court disaster. Continue reading "How to Avoid Trumping the Legal History of Removal"