Nov 16, 2023 Brian BixJurisprudence
Andrew Halpin,
The Systematization of Legal Norms: A Response to Navarro and Rodríguez,
in Jurisprudence in the Mirror: The Civil Law World Meets the Common Law World (Luka Burazin, Giorgio Pino & Kenneth Einar Himma, eds., forthcoming), available at
SSRN (Feb. 15, 2022).
A forthcoming collection, Jurisprudence in the Mirror, displays similarities and differences in both practice and theory across the divide between civil law legal systems (e.g., those of Continental Europe and Central and South America) and common law legal systems (like those of U.S. and the UK). In the book, each chapter offers civil law scholars discussing a single topic of legal theory or legal practice (e.g., legal validity, sources of law, and legal interpretation, and legal reasoning) followed by a commentary on the chapter by common law scholars. In The Systematization of Legal Norms: A Response to Navarro and Rodríguez, which will appear in Jurisprudence in the Mirror, Andrew Halpin represents the common law world, and is commenting on civil law scholars, Pablo Navarro and Jorge Rodríguez, who had as their topic, deontic logic.
By way of background, deontic logic, the logic of norms (including legal norms), is an oft-discussed topic in civil law countries, but one that has been given relatively little attention in common law countries. There are well-known complications to the project of deontic logic: e.g., norms themselves (e.g., “do not park here”) do not seem to be the sort of things that can be true or false, in which case, how is a logic of norms possible? One standard response–a response adopted by Navarro and Rodriguez (P. 7)–is to move from norms to norm propositions (e.g., “the law states: ‘do not park here’”), where such propositions do seem subject to characterization as true or false. Halpin’s argument in this piece, however, is not focused on the abstract level of whether or how logic is possible about normative matters, but rather on a more concrete level, regarding Navarro and Rodriguez’s effort to show that deontic logic is useful in understanding and developing the law (in either civil law or common law legal systems). Continue reading "A Challenge to Deontic Logic"
Nov 15, 2023 David FagundesIntellectual Property Law
Christopher Buccafusco & Rebecca Tushnet, Of Bass Notes and Base Rates: Avoiding Mistaken Inferences About Copying, __ Hous. L. Rev. __ (forthcoming, 2023).
Some years ago I attended a presentation by a musicologist who specialized in giving testimony in copyright litigation. Here’s how he tried to grab the audience: First, he would play a clip from a well-known track by a popular musician or band. Then he would play a selection from an earlier, lesser-known track by an obscure musician or band that sounded similar to the first clip, all while giving the audience a wide-eyed stare. The impression this created was intentional and unmistakable. Clearly the well-known artist had copied from the lesser-known one!
The audience, mostly laypeople, certainly bought it, based on the gasps that accompanied the presenter’s schtick. I did not, and left frustrated that the musicologist-turned-expert-witness had tricked the audience into thinking that he had exposed several instances of egregious copyright infringement. I knew something was wrong but had difficulty putting my finger on just what was the problem with the presenter’s move.
Thanks to Christopher Buccafusco and Rebecca Tushnet’s sparkling essay, Of Bass Notes and Base Rates: Avoiding Mistaken Inferences About Copying, I finally have a clear picture of the error that afflicted that presentation and so much copyright litigation. As the authors explain, the application of copyright’s substantial similarity problem suffers from base rate neglect, which causes courts and litigants to significantly overstate the likelihood that a defendant copied from a plaintiff. Continue reading "All About That Base Rate"
Nov 14, 2023 John C.P. GoldbergTorts
A.I. in the form of Large Language Models (LLMs) is altering the ways in which we work, learn, and live. Along with their many upsides, an already familiar downside of LLMs is their propensity to “hallucinate” – that is, respond to factual queries with predictions or guesses that are false yet proffered as true. And some of these hallucinations are not merely false but defamatory. For example, if one were to query an A.I. program: “Of which crimes has Professor X of ABC Law School been convicted?,” it might respond with a fabricated list of offenses. When defamatory hallucinations occur, who faces (or should face) liability, and on what terms? In Large Libel Models? Liability for AI Output Eugene Volokh lays out with great care a detailed roadmap for answering these questions.
Much of Professor Volokh’s article is devoted to considering and rejecting grounds for supposing that creators and operators of A.I. models enjoy blanket protection from defamation liability. First among these is an argument based on the tech industry’s best friend: Section 230 of the federal Communications Decency Act (“CDA 230”). As courts have interpreted it, this statute confers broad immunity on internet platforms for defamatory content created by third parties that they host or provide. As such, Volokh persuasively argues, CDA 230 will typically be of no help to A.I. companies, because, even if their models have been trained on third party texts, it is the programs, not a third party, that generates the defamatory content. Continue reading "Defamation by Hallucination"
Nov 13, 2023 Leah LitmanConstitutional Law
Jessica A. Clarke,
Sex Discrimination Formalism, __
Va. L. Rev. __ (forthcoming 2023), available on
SSRN (Aug. 13, 2023).
What is sex discrimination? Or, more generally, what is discrimination?
This question has often centered around a few recurring divisions in constitutional and antidiscrimination law. One division is between intentional discrimination and disparate impact theories of liability; another break is between formal equality and substantive equality; another, related divide is between anti-classification theories of equality and anti-subordination theories.
In her timely new article, Sex Discrimination Formalism, Professor Jessica Clarke smartly unpacks the category of “formal equality” and shows that, at different points, it encompasses a family of different theories that sometimes travel together, but not always. Clarke argues that courts applying “formal” approaches to equality are sometimes using “but for” causation, asking whether some protected trait or characteristic is the but-for cause of differential treatment. But courts adopting a “formal” approach to equality sometimes use “anti-classification” theories of equality, asking if a protected trait or characteristic has been used to categorize or sort individuals. Finally, courts might use a “similarly situated” test that examines whether someone has been treated differently than someone who is “similarly situated” to them (but who does not have a particular trait or characteristic). Continue reading "Toggle Boggle"
Nov 10, 2023 Kristen StiltInternational & Comparative Law
It is a rare event to begin reading an article and soon realize that the approach the author is taking is so novel, so creative, so analytically precise, and indeed so brilliant that it should redirect and reshape an entire field of study. I am pleased to jot about an article that does just that: Saskia Stucki’s Animal Warfare Law and the Need for an Animal Law of Peace: A Comparative Reconstruction. Stucki begins with a short quote from George Orwell’s 1984: “War is peace.” This is far more than a catchy epigraph; it strikes at the heart of the main problem with how humans treat animals in law and society all over the world today. In many or even most jurisdictions, what is typically called “animal welfare law” seemingly refers to laws intended to ensure the welfare of animals. As Stucki argues so clearly, that is a seriously flawed understanding of the situation of animals. Most animals are used and exploited by humans for human desires, and the largest number of animals by far are ones whom humans raise to kill for food. What does welfare possibly mean when we are talking about use, exploitation, and slaughter? For proponents of an animal welfare strategy, it means reducing suffering.
For some animal advocates, there is no chance of providing any meaningful welfare in these situations, and it is Orwellian to say that an animal was killed for food in a high welfare way, or that the welfare needs of an elephant in a circus were attended to when the only way to make elephants perform entirely unnatural tricks is through brute force in training. To actually improve the condition of animals demands recognition that they are rights holders and actual implementation of basic rights: the rights to liberty and bodily integrity, for example. Getting the animal out of the cage altogether, not just a more comfortable cage. These two approaches may seem to be running on different tracks and moving in different directions, and never the twain shall meet. This article rejects the notion that animal welfare law and animal rights are “competing and mutually exclusive paradigms for the legal protection of animals.” (P. 9.) The brilliance of this article is that Stucki does not merely take down this notion. She shows that the two approaches are instead “distinct yet complementary bodies of law” (P. 9) by clearly and precisely analogizing the laws regarding animals to the laws regarding war. Continue reading "War is Peace"
Nov 9, 2023 Goldburn MaynardTrusts & Estates
The modernization of probate codes has been a slow and fraught proposition. States have long set different requirements for formalizing wills. To this day there are still states that require strict compliance with all formalities, including that a will be in writing, that it be signed, and that it also be signed by two witnesses. The COVID-19 pandemic forced legislators into an uncomfortable and reluctant embrace of the twenty-first century. In his recent article, Professor Richard F. Sorrow tracks the unprecedented if clumsy implementation of two controversial reforms of traditional wills: remote attestation and electronic wills.
For centuries, in both England and the United States, the steps required to execute a will had to be followed precisely. A small technicality or flaw could invalidate a will. Perhaps a witness was not in the room at the same time as the other witness or the testator signed the will in the wrong place. As Storrow underscores, society’s main concern was distinguishing between authentic and fraudulent wills. England’s influential Wills Act of 1837 attempted to get it right. To ensure that the will represented the wishes of the testator, without interference from anyone else, courts construed the Act to require strict compliance with all of the formalities. This weeded out many fraudulent wills but also some authentic ones. In fact, the application of strict compliance sometimes led to dispositions that were very different from those the testator intended. Continue reading "Socially Distanced Wills"
Nov 8, 2023 Christina S. HoHealth Law
Wendy Parmet has a new book out, called Constitutional Contagion: COVID, the Courts, and Public Health. It is a long-awaited sequel of sorts to one of her earlier books, Populations, Public Health and the Law (2009). I mention this because, while COVID is the occasion for her argument, i.e., the circumstance that brings her point to the sharpest focus, the account is actually one she has been building for a long time, and its implications transcend the current crisis. At the most general level, Parmet argues for the health of the polity as not just one of but perhaps even the most central value that our laws exist to serve. In this newest volume, she surveys our Constitutional jurisprudence, re-centering our understanding of America’s foundational law in relation to its most fundamental material stakes.
Parmet’s argument proceeds with the sound, measured consideration that we know and trust from her body of work. Thus, she is perfectly within rights to distinguish her position from my maximalist gloss. But as an intemperate enthusiast of the Parmet project, I view her work as teeing up the claim that population health is part of the inner morality of law. Just as Lon Fuller found reciprocity, human agency, and a certain formal integrity to inhere in law, Parmet finds an additional substantive morality at the ground level of law’s project. As she says in her first book, “[P]ublic health is not simply a norm, but also a legal norm that should be embraced by and incorporated into the legal system.” (P. 52.) Continue reading "Is the Health of the People Part of the Inner Morality of Law?"
Nov 8, 2023 Aníbal Rosario-LebrónFamily Law
Words are, perhaps, the most powerful of human creations. Through words, we see and unsee. We celebrate and condemn. We build and destroy. And through words, we create and exert the power of the law. Lisa Washington’s Survived & Coerced: Epistemic Injustice in the Family Regulation System reminds us of this potent symbiotic relationship between words and the law.
Drawing from her experience as a public defender in New York City, Washington expounds in her article how the family regulation system (a.k.a. child welfare system) procures, fosters, and engages in epistemic injustice to reproduce and legitimize its purported goal of child safety whilst it serves as an arm of the carceral state to further marginalize women, the poor, and people of color. Epistemic injustice, coined in political philosophy by Miranda Fricker, attempts to depict the connection between power, oppression, and prejudice in the realms of knowledge production and reproduction. Fricker defines the concept as the unfair treatment of a person or a group in their capacity to know or describe their experiences. Such unfair treatment harms people in their capacity as knowers as they are subjugated by societal power structures expressed in stereotypical assumptions. The concept of epistemic injustice, thus, captures the long-discussed disparity by jurists, activists, and feminists such as Sojourner Truth that some voices, forms of knowledge, stories, and experiences are more audible, more important, easily believed, and heavily weighed than others. Continue reading "Law’s Power in Naming & Silencing"
Nov 7, 2023 Mark WeberEquality
People use disability metaphors all the time, from complaining about a “disabled bus” to remarking on the barrier to filing a claim due to a “legal disability.” In Disability as Metaphor in American Law, Doron Dorfman disapproves of the use of disability metaphors in general, and specifically challenges what he calls “disability frame advocacy.” Disability frame advocacy is the metaphorical use of the disability discrimination concept to argue that society should address disadvantages not associated with physical or mental impairment, but instead associated with poverty or other experiences or characteristics. Dorfman defines this term as “when scholars and advocates use disability rights frameworks and disability as [a] metaphor to advocate for resources, recognition, and redress for members of oppressed groups who do not live with disabilities.” (P. 1757.)
Examples of disability frame advocacy include invoking disability as a rhetorical device to argue for accommodations to make up for disadvantages imposed by structural racial inequality or discriminatory attitudes toward transgender persons, persons who use opioids, and people who are unhoused. (Pp. 1783-84.) These forms of discrimination may be “disabilities” in a metaphorical sense, but the disadvantages imposed differ from disadvantages that stem from social conditions relating to physical or mental impairment. Dorfman acknowledges that people who are discriminated against on the basis of race, who are impoverished, or who face other disadvantages in society may have claims for positive rights to support or accommodations. He nevertheless opposes using disability frame advocacy in this context to argue for the accommodations and other remedies. He contends that the rhetorical use of disability outside the disability context obscures the unique disadvantages imposed on people who have physical or mental impairments. Continue reading "Abandoning Metaphors and Reclaiming Impairment"
Nov 6, 2023 SpearItCriminal Law
When you think about why people are convicted of a crime, it seems absurd to say, “because there are bad people” or “because people do bad things.” Such responses, by themselves, would be an over-simplification that overlooks key contributors. For example, some might commit crimes due to the inability to feed oneself or one’s family. It is also true that some people confess to crimes they didn’t commit, often just to get out of the criminal system. Some people did nothing wrong at all and were wrongfully convicted. Similarly, mass incarceration defies any singular explanation.
In Mass Incarceration Nation, former prosecutor and law professor, Jeffrey Bellin, seeks to describe the primary factors that have brought us to this place in history. In the last few decades, the United States has become a world leader in incarceration, such that prison systems in places like Texas and California rank among the largest systems in the world. While explanations about mass incarceration proliferate, Bellin identifies multiple contributions through a more nuanced approach to understanding the problem. While many might consider race and class as the driving factors, as this work shows, the picture is more complicated. Continue reading "America’s Punishment Addiction Explained"
